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====Senssory Mental Objects====Somtimes the brain finds several connections between diffrent sets of inputs, that come toghther. When several connections are reoccuring they form a cluster of inductions that form Mental Object ([[MO]]).For instance a specfic smell may come always when specific shape and specifice color and specific feeling appaer. A smell of an apple may come with a shape of an apple, a color of an apple and a taste of an apple. This cluster of connections will create for us a femiler object that when ever we see one, we will assume that all other coneection will appaer also. If we will also hear the same name ("apple") every time we will see some of the connected appreances, we will also give him a name: "apple" that will be part of the mental object<ref>Wittgenstein, L. (1973). Philosophical Investigations (3rd Edition) (p. 250). Pearson. Retrieved from http://www.amazon.com/Philosophical-Investigations-Edition-Ludwig-Wittgenstein/dp/0024288101</ref>that will be part of the mental object. Mental Objects are compused of connections by inductions and as every induction in the phenomenological cage, they should be put to a test. therefore MO may change and rewire. For instance, every apple we have seen so far where green. Sudenly I see a shape of an apple, I smell a smell of an apple and it has a feeling of an apple, but it's color is red and it's taste is diffrent. What is it. I have expreinced a refutation of my expected apperances by the old MO(apple). As in every induction, when it is refuted, we have to find new relations that will describe all appreance we have seen so far. The posiblities to describe all phenomena is infinte, and again we will look for the simplest sets of connections that will describe all abservations. Two very simple rearngment will be to say that they are tow diffrent object or to diffrent kinds of the same object. In the first solution we will have an "apple" and a "arbego" (some new word that we may invent). The first will be more simple then the second (A picture that describe it), and we may prfer it. But further evidance may suggest that we should divied it to two diffrent mental objects. For instance if we late, when our theoris will be sufficiantly developed to the point when we recognize a "DNA" and we may find that they have a DNA linage that is very diffrent, and because we defined DNA as an assntial proprtie of a leaving object, we may decide that they are two diffrent mental objects.