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→Simplicity
The mind assume similarity between phenomena or sensory inputs when they are closely matched order of phenomena. In a philospohical manner it is hard to define similarity in phenomena. For some solution you can go to Churchland<ref>[http://books.google.co.il/books/about/Plato_s_Camera.html?id=-QmCmfTO3TEC&redir_esc=y Paul M. Churchland. (2012). Plato’s Camera: How the Physical Brain Captures a Landscape of Abstract Universals. MIT Press.]</ref>. When using neurons we can say that when signals from the same sets of receptors or from same set of sensory objects occur simultaneously, they will initiate an [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long-term_potentiation LTP]<ref>Teyler, T. J., & DiScenna, P. (1987). Long-term potentiation. Annual review of neuroscience, 10, 131–61.</ref> somewhere down the neural-networks, and will cause induction or LTP between the set of receptors or the set of sensory objects. In an optimal repetitions temporally sequence of similar inputs, the LTP will be strengthen.
====Simplicityand Induction====The relation between two similar phenomena might be very simple. They may be linked directly. For instance, A sound of a broken glass may be directly connected to a braking glass. But it can be connected in more complex way, for instance there may be some computer that create a breaking sound, whenever I see a breaking glass. Or this connection may be correct until some time, ans it may be wrong in some future time<ref>[http://www.amazon.com/Fact-Fiction-Forecast-Fourth-Edition/dp/0674290712 Goodman, N., & Putnam, H. (1983). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Fourth Edition (p. 160). Harvard University Press.]</ref>. The reason to chose the most simple connection is beacause because the number of available possible relations between a sound and a breaking glass are infinite. Therefore for reasons of effective storage, we will use the simplest solution avilableavailable, which will be ''"All breaking glasses so far observed has this specific sound"'all '. Although this statement may be true it can not tell us nothing about the next occasion of breaking glass. If we will test it and we will find that next time we will hear a different sound, we might say that "All breaking glasses so far observed has this specific sound, while the last had another sound"'''. By describing the relations between the phenomena in a descriptive mode, we may reach very fast to infinite numbers of description. So yet again for the sake of simplicity, we will try to describe the relations as inductions. Inductions are rules that are assumed to be true for every occasion regardless of time or place. In our example, we will say that induction when a glass brakes it has specific sound ("broken glass sound"). But we will try to constantly refute it, to see if it still holds. This
==Other Asspects of Epistemology==