Long-term personal good
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Revision as of 01:45, 20 February 2024 by WinSysop (talk | contribs) (WinSysop moved page Common good to Long-term personal good: better description)
Revision as of 01:45, 20 February 2024 by WinSysop (talk | contribs) (WinSysop moved page Common good to Long-term personal good: better description)
People express less self-regarding preferences in games framed in social contexts than in games framed in market contexts[1]. The cooperative disposition of an agent is also connected with the question of whether the agent conceptualizes a given situation in terms of an “I”-frame of self-interest, or a “we”-frame ofcollective interest. [2][3]
Building democratic societies entails informing citizens of their rights and responsibilities. Citizens must know how they can actively engage in governance. They must have a platform to express their voice, hold the powerful to account and collectively determine the common good[4]
References
- ↑ Eiser, J. R., & Bhavnani, K.-K. (1974). The effect of situational meaning on the behaviour of subjects in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. European Journal of Social Psychology, 4(1), 93–97.
- ↑ Michael Bacharach, ‘‘We’ Equilib ria: A Variable Frame Theory of Cooperation’, Working paper, Institute of Economics and Statistics, University of Oxford, 1997
- ↑ Michael Bacharach and Michele Bernasconi, ‘The Variable Frame Theory of Focal Points: An Experimental Study’,Games and Economic Behavior, 19 (1997), 1-45.
- ↑ Rodny-Gumede, Y. (2015b). Marricana massacre: How South African journalism failed the test. The Conversation. 25 November 2015.