Difference between revisions of "Long-term personal good"
From Deliberative Democracy Institiute Wiki
(Created page with "People express less self-regarding preferences in games framed in social contexts than in games framed in market contexts<ref>Eiser, J. R., & Bhavnani, K.-K. (1974). The effec...") |
|||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
| − | People express less self-regarding preferences in games framed in social contexts than in games framed in market contexts<ref>Eiser, J. R., & Bhavnani, K.-K. (1974). The effect of situational meaning on the behaviour of subjects in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. European Journal of Social Psychology, 4(1), 93–97.</ref> | + | People express less self-regarding preferences in games framed in social contexts than in games framed in market contexts<ref>Eiser, J. R., & Bhavnani, K.-K. (1974). The effect of situational meaning on the behaviour of subjects in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. European Journal of Social Psychology, 4(1), 93–97.</ref>. The cooperative disposition of an agent is also connected with the question of whether the agent conceptualizes a given situation in terms of an “I”-frame of self-interest, or a “we”-frame ofcollective interest. <ref>Michael Bacharach, ‘‘We’ Equilib ria: A Variable Frame Theory of Cooperation’, Working paper, Institute of Economics and Statistics, University of Oxford, 1997</ref><ref>Michael Bacharach and Michele Bernasconi, ‘The Variable Frame Theory of Focal Points: An Experimental Study’,Games and Economic Behavior, 19 (1997), 1-45. </ref> |
==References== | ==References== | ||
Revision as of 05:17, 11 February 2014
People express less self-regarding preferences in games framed in social contexts than in games framed in market contexts[1]. The cooperative disposition of an agent is also connected with the question of whether the agent conceptualizes a given situation in terms of an “I”-frame of self-interest, or a “we”-frame ofcollective interest. [2][3]
References
- ↑ Eiser, J. R., & Bhavnani, K.-K. (1974). The effect of situational meaning on the behaviour of subjects in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. European Journal of Social Psychology, 4(1), 93–97.
- ↑ Michael Bacharach, ‘‘We’ Equilib ria: A Variable Frame Theory of Cooperation’, Working paper, Institute of Economics and Statistics, University of Oxford, 1997
- ↑ Michael Bacharach and Michele Bernasconi, ‘The Variable Frame Theory of Focal Points: An Experimental Study’,Games and Economic Behavior, 19 (1997), 1-45.