Difference between revisions of "Argument repertoire"
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==Measuring== | ==Measuring== | ||
| + | ===Principles=== | ||
For any given stated opinion on an issue, argument repertoire includes: | For any given stated opinion on an issue, argument repertoire includes: | ||
# The number of relevant reasons for the stated opinion. | # The number of relevant reasons for the stated opinion. | ||
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:''Genuine evidence'' is relatively infrequent, and Kuhn required a series of questions and probes in face-to-face interviews to elicit the little evidence that people offered. | :''Genuine evidence'' is relatively infrequent, and Kuhn required a series of questions and probes in face-to-face interviews to elicit the little evidence that people offered. | ||
:''Coherence'' (or integrative complexity) requires at least two arguments plus elaboration. In the current application, they have ignored integrative complexity. | :''Coherence'' (or integrative complexity) requires at least two arguments plus elaboration. In the current application, they have ignored integrative complexity. | ||
| + | |||
| + | Finally, our analytic system does not attempt to ''distinguish accurate from inaccurate reasons''. For example, suppose a person favored the Republican party and did so “because the party’s policies favored the poor over the rich.” We do not judge this | ||
| + | claim as inaccurate primarily because it is extremely difficult to know what reasons and evidence support the claim. A person could believe in trickle-down economics and so support policies that enrich the wealthy with the expectation of improving the plight of | ||
| + | the poor. We leave factually accurate and inaccurate responses to the realm of standard closed-ended knowledge questions. | ||
| + | ===Measuring=== | ||
| + | |||
| + | At the baseline surveys all respondents were asked whether they were favorable or unfavorable toward each of the two parties, on a 4-point ordinal scale. Following these questions, we asked them in four open-ended questions to write reasons why they were favorable or unfavorable toward the party and why other people would be unfavorable or favorable toward it, respectively. | ||
| + | |||
| + | Then for every relevant reason to support their belif, they got one point. And the same for counter arguments (for full description see pp. 79-80) | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==Evaluation== | ||
| + | Those with higher scores on AR are people with expected political and communication profiles. Those with higher AR are more educated, have greater political knowledge, more interest in politics, more exposure and attention to news, more interpersonal communication about politics, more commitment to their political parties, and are older. | ||
| + | |||
| + | Yet AR do not test for [[falsifiability]], so people with high AR can be peole how tend to favor debates. | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
Latest revision as of 01:18, 22 July 2014
Argument repertoire is a method to measure quality of arguments in deliberation[1]. It is base on Deanna Kuhn work on arrguments[2]. For Kuhn, Those who can identify multiple explanations with genuine evidence for them, counterarguments to their own explanations, and a resolution in favor of their own explanation are at the highest levels of knowledge about the issue under discussion.
Measuring
Principles
For any given stated opinion on an issue, argument repertoire includes:
- The number of relevant reasons for the stated opinion.
- The number of relevant reasons for the opposite opinion.
The reasons provided must be relevant. By relevant, we mean reasons that are acknowledged in public discourse as plausible reasons. Irrelevant reasons could include a person’s statement that he or she liked Republicans or knew some Republicans.
Unlike Kuhn, Cappella et al., do not try to include genuine evidence in support of reasons as a part of the evaluation of argument repertoire, nor do they attempt to ascertain the coherence among multiple reasons (e.g., Tetlock, 1989[3]). Both dimensions are plausible components of argument repertoire. However, they want to employ measure in a survey context.
- Genuine evidence is relatively infrequent, and Kuhn required a series of questions and probes in face-to-face interviews to elicit the little evidence that people offered.
- Coherence (or integrative complexity) requires at least two arguments plus elaboration. In the current application, they have ignored integrative complexity.
Finally, our analytic system does not attempt to distinguish accurate from inaccurate reasons. For example, suppose a person favored the Republican party and did so “because the party’s policies favored the poor over the rich.” We do not judge this claim as inaccurate primarily because it is extremely difficult to know what reasons and evidence support the claim. A person could believe in trickle-down economics and so support policies that enrich the wealthy with the expectation of improving the plight of the poor. We leave factually accurate and inaccurate responses to the realm of standard closed-ended knowledge questions.
Measuring
At the baseline surveys all respondents were asked whether they were favorable or unfavorable toward each of the two parties, on a 4-point ordinal scale. Following these questions, we asked them in four open-ended questions to write reasons why they were favorable or unfavorable toward the party and why other people would be unfavorable or favorable toward it, respectively.
Then for every relevant reason to support their belif, they got one point. And the same for counter arguments (for full description see pp. 79-80)
Evaluation
Those with higher scores on AR are people with expected political and communication profiles. Those with higher AR are more educated, have greater political knowledge, more interest in politics, more exposure and attention to news, more interpersonal communication about politics, more commitment to their political parties, and are older.
Yet AR do not test for falsifiability, so people with high AR can be peole how tend to favor debates.
References
- ↑ Cappella, J. N., Price, V., & Nir, L. (2002). Argument repertoire as a reliable and valid measure of opinion quality: Electronic dialogue during campaign 2000. Political Communication, 19(1), 73–93.
- ↑ Kuhn, D. (1991). The skills of argument. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- ↑ Tetlock, P. (1989). Structure and function in political belief systems. In A. Pratkanis, S. Breckler, & A. Greenwald (Eds.), Attitude structure and function. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.