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→Senssory Mental Objects
[[File:Refutation_of_mental_object_apple.JPG|200px|thumb|left|Refutation of a mental object:apple]]
[[File:Reconstraction_of_mental_object_apple.JPG|200px|thumb|left|One of the infnite ways to reconstract the MO:apple]]
Mental Objects are compused of inductions and as every induction in the phenomenological cage, they should be put to a test. Therefore MOs may change and reconstracted. For instance, all the apples we have seen so far were red. Sudenly I see a shape of an apple, I smell a smell of an apple and it has a feeling of an apple, but it's color is green and it's taste is diffrent. What is it? I have expreinced a refutation of my expected apperances by the old MO:apple. As in every induction, when it is refuted, we have to find new set of inductions that will describe all appreance we have seen so far. The posiblities to describe all phenomena is infinte, and again we will look for the simplest sets of connections that will describe all abservations. One simple rearngments will be to say that the old observations and the new observationare are two diffrent objects. Another simple reconstruction will be to say that all my observation relating this MO:apple are of the smae object but diffrent of kinds. In the former the connection to red and sweet (This is the taste of the red object), will be on mental object, while the the green and the soure will be another object. Both objects have the same shape and the the same touch and the same smell, but different colors and tastes. In the later, they are all apples, and apples have purticular shape, feeling and smell, but there is a ''kind'' of red-sweet appels and there is a ''kind'' of green-sour appels. of course there may be other ways to to reconstruct mental objects. We can say that all apples are red, but sombody painted and weetend this last observation of an apple, or this was an accident, frique freak of nature and so on.
To decide ifbetween alternatives we may need some more avidance. Further evidance may suggest that we should divied it to two diffrent mental objects. For instance if our theoris will be sufficiantly developed to the point when we recognize a "DNA" thus we may find that they have a DNA linage that is very diffrent, and because we defined DNA as an assntial proprtie of a leaving object, we may decide that they are two diffrent mental objects.
====Deductions====
Mental Objects construct our understanding of the world. When we reason, we can go along the lines of connected MOs. For instance, humans have many inductions. We know that they have two legs, two arms, they leave up to 120 years, and in the meanwhile they breath, born and die, and many other inductions ([[why an object don't has proprties but it has inductions|mistakenly called proprties]]). We also know (or conjecture) that Socrates was human, and as such he has all the inductions of the ''MO:humans''.
When we use the clasical sylogism "Socrats was human, all humens are mortal, therfore Socrates is mortal" we go along the lines that connect the MOs. By this mechanism we may say that Socrates was also born. If we want to speculate how old was his mother when she gave birth to Socrates we need some other inductions and mental object. we need to conjectures in what ege women can give birth (age 12-45), and that humans are born by womens and that that woman is his mother. Therefore we can conculde that Socrates was born when his mother was at the age of 12-45, and we therfore conclude that his mother is 12-45 years older then Socrates.
{{nc|More ilustrations will be very helpfull. If equations can be enterd, this will be awsome.|[[User:WinSysop|Tal Yaron]] 09:13, 14 December 2012 (IST)}}}
==Other Asspects of Epistemology==