Mental Objects are compused of connections by inductions and as every induction in the phenomenological cage, they should be put to a test. therefore MO Therefore MOs may change and rewirereconstracted. For instance, every apple all the apples we have seen so far where greenwere red. Sudenly I see a shape of an apple, I smell a smell of an apple and it has a feeling of an apple, but it's color is red green and it's taste is diffrent. What is it. ? I have expreinced a refutation of my expected apperances by the old MO(:apple). As in every induction, when it is refuted, we have to find new relations set of inductions that will describe all appreance we have seen so far. The posiblities to describe all phenomena is infinte, and again we will look for the simplest sets of connections that will describe all abservations. Two very One simple rearngment rearngments will be to say that they the old observations and the new observationare are tow two diffrent objects. Another simple reconstruction will be to say that all my observation relating this MO:apple are of the smae object or to but diffrent of kinds . In the former the connection to red and sweet (This is the taste of the red object), will be on mental object, while the the green and the soure will be another object. Both objects have the same objectshape and the the same touch and the same smell, but different colors and tastes. In the first solution we will later, they are all apples, and apples have an "apple" purticular shape, feeling and smell, but there is a ''kind'' of red-sweet appels and there is a "arbego" (some new word that we ''kind'' of green-sour appels. of course there may invent)be other ways to to reconstruct mental objects. The first will be more simple then the second (A picture We can say that describe it)all apples are red, but sombody painted and weetend this last observation of an apple, or this was an accident, frique of nature and so on. To decide ifbetween alternatives we may prfer itneed some more avidance. But further Further evidance may suggest that we should divied it to two diffrent mental objects. For instance if we late, when our theoris will be sufficiantly developed to the point when we recognize a "DNA" and thus we may find that they have a DNA linage that is very diffrent, and because we defined DNA as an assntial proprtie of a leaving object, we may decide that they are two diffrent mental objects.