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→Simplicity and Induction
====Simplicity and Induction====
The relation between two similar phenomena might be very simple. They may be linked directly. For instance, A sound of a broken glass may be directly connected to a braking glass. But it can be connected in more complex way, for instance there may be some computer that create a breaking sound, whenever I see a breaking glass. Or this connection may be correct until some time, ans it may be wrong in some future time<ref>[http://www.amazon.com/Fact-Fiction-Forecast-Fourth-Edition/dp/0674290712 Goodman, N., & Putnam, H. (1983). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Fourth Edition (p. 160). Harvard University Press.]</ref>. The reason to chose the most simple connection is because the number of available possible relations between a sound and a breaking glass are infinite. Therefore for reasons of effective storage, we will use the simplest solution available, which will be ''"All breaking glasses so far observed , has this specific sound"''.
Although this statement may be true it can not tell us nothing about the next occasion of breaking glass. If we will test it and we will find that next time we will hear a different sound, we might say that "All breaking glasses so far observed has this specific sound, while the last had another sound"''. By describing the relations between the phenomena in a descriptive mode, we may reach very fast to infinite numbers of description. So yet again for the sake of simplicity, we will try to describe the relations as inductions.
We should strive to achive the simplest sets of inductions that describes erey observed relations between the phenomena. This set inductions (also called theories) will be called descriptive theories. If the sets of inductions also enable us to manipulate phenomena preciasly<ref>Habermas, J. (1985). The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society (p. 465). Beacon Press.</ref> it will be called forcasting theories. The inductions are like equations that describe phenomena in more economical way<ref>Ernst, M. (1986). On the Economical Nature of Physical Inquiry. Popular Scientific Lectures (pp. 186–214). Open Court.</ref>.
==The Structure of Theories==
===Mental Objects===
Somtimes the brain finds several connections between diffrent sets of inputs. When several connections are reoccuring they form Mental Object ([[MO]]).For instance a specfic smell may come always when specific shape and specifice color and specific feeling appaer. A smell of an apple may come with a shape of an apple, a color of an apple and a taste of an apple. This cluster of connections will create for us a femiler object that when ever we see one, we will assume that all other coneection will appaer also. If we will also hear the same name ("apple") every time we will see some of the connected appreances, we will also give him a name: "apple" that will be part of the mental object<ref>Wittgenstein, L. (1973). Philosophical Investigations (3rd Edition) (p. 250). Pearson. Retrieved from http://www.amazon.com/Philosophical-Investigations-Edition-Ludwig-Wittgenstein/dp/0024288101</ref>.
==Other Asspects of Epistemology==