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Regulatory Focus Theory

3,718 bytes added, 19:14, 19 August 2012
Created page with "Taken from [http://psychoanalystsopposewar.org/resources_files/ConsevatismAsMotivatedSocialCognition.pdf Jost et all 2003. p.348-9] Higgins (1997, 1998) proposed a regulatory..."
Taken from [http://psychoanalystsopposewar.org/resources_files/ConsevatismAsMotivatedSocialCognition.pdf Jost et all 2003. p.348-9]

Higgins (1997, 1998) proposed a regulatory focus theory that is
pertinent to the psychology of conservatism. This theory distinguishes between two categories of desired goals, namely those
related to advancement, growth, and aspirations (ideals) and those
related to safety, security, and responsibilities (oughts). Distinct
regulatory systems are presumed to address these two classes of
goals. The promotion system reflects individuals’ self-regulation
in relation to their hopes and aspirations (ideals), and it gratifies
nurturance needs. The goal of the promotion system is accomplishment. By contrast, the prevention system reflects self-regulation in
relation to one’s duties and obligations (oughts), and the goal of
this system is safety. According to this theory, a parenting history
of protection focusing on the avoidance of negative outcomes
combined with the exercise of punishment as a disciplinary tool
produces a strong prevention focus as a stable individual orientation. A parenting style of encouraging accomplishments by focusing on achieving positive outcomes and withdrawing love as a
form of discipline produces a strong promotion focus as a stable
individual orientation.

It is also plausible that an emphasis on prevention (vs. promotion) induces a heightened need for cognitive closure as one
consequence of the craving for a secure and comprehensible reality. Like the theory of lay epistemics, regulatory focus theory
leaves open the possibility of anchoring disproportionately on
left-wing ideas (to the extent that a leftist ideology constitutes the
status quo), but at the same time, the theory suggests a general
preference by prevention-oriented, versus promotion-oriented, individuals for conservative over liberal ideologies, all else being
equal. Finally, like the theory of lay epistemics, regulatory focus
theory allows for situational as well as personality factors to drive
the inclination toward conservatism.

Regulatory focus, then, has fairly obvious implications for individuals’ attitudes toward stability and change, and perhaps even
for left- versus right-wing preferences. Specifically, the promotion
goals of accomplishment and advancement should naturally introduce a preference for change over stability, insofar as advancement
requires change. The prevention goals of safety and security, on
the other hand, should favor stability over change, to the extent
that stability entails predictability and hence psychological security and control. In signal-detection terms, a promotion focus is
concerned with obtaining hits and avoiding misses, whereas a
prevention focus is concerned with obtaining correct rejections
and avoiding false alarms. Any change has the potential benefit of
providing an opportunity for advancement and accomplishment (a
hit) but has the potential cost of introducing an error of commission. Because such an error is of relatively low concern to persons
with a promotion focus, they should be relatively open to change.
By contrast, stability has the potential benefit of safety and security
(a correct rejection) but has the potential cost of introducing an
error of omission, which is of lesser concern to individuals with a
prevention focus who, therefore, should be resistant to change. To
the extent that political conservatism is motivated, at least in part,
by the desire for security and stability and the avoidance of threat
and change, situations inducing a prevention-oriented regulatory
focus might also induce a conservative shift in the general
population.

==References==
<references/>