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Epistemology

1,119 bytes removed, 01:04, 5 May 2013
Explaining the Mechanisms of Knowledge
I will aslo assume that the mind can store past SPs for a while.
====Similarityand Induction====In the memory when a combination of two or more SPs reoccurs, a connection in the memory is formed. For instance, if a smell<sub>x</sub> occur with specific sound<sub>y</sub>, and this combination reoccur several time while the still in memory, then the memory might assume that the combination is eminent. Therefore always, when smell<sub>x</sub> appear; also sound<sub>y</sub> appear. This will be called induction, because from some limited set of co-occurrence, the mind will assume that this co-occurrence will always reoccur. Of course the induction might not stand the next occurrence of either one of the SPs. We will deal with that later.
The mind assume similarity between sequential phenomena or sensory inputs when the mind find that a set of phenomena has, by See also [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_%28philosophy%29 the way it precives, resmblance to other set problem of phenomena, all ready stored in his memory. We then can say that there were some order in phenomena, that was resamble to other order in the phenomena.identity]
In ====Simplicity====The relation between two SPs might be very simple. They may be linked directly. For instance, A sound of a philospohical manner broken glass may be directly connected to a look of a braking glass. But it is hard to define similarity can be connected in phenomenamore complex way, for instance there may be some computer that create a breaking sound, whenever I see a breaking glass. For Or this connection may be correct until some time, and it may be wrong in some solution you can go to Churchlandfuture time<ref>[http://books.googlewww.coamazon.ilcom/booksFact-Fiction-Forecast-Fourth-Edition/aboutdp/Plato_s_Camera0674290712 Goodman, N.html?id=-QmCmfTO3TEC, &redir_esc=y Paul MPutnam, H. Churchland(1983). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Fourth Edition (2012p. 160). Plato’s Camera: How the Physical Brain Captures a Landscape of Abstract Universals. MIT Harvard University Press.]</ref>. The reason to chose the most simple connection is because the number of available possible relations between a sound and a breaking glass are infinite. Therefore for reasons of effective storage, we will use the simplest solution available, which will be ''"All breaking glasses has this specific sound"''.
When using neurons we can say that when signals from the same sets of receptors or from same set of sensory objects occur simultaneously, they will initiate an [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long-term_potentiation LTP]<ref>Teyler, T. J., & DiScenna, P. (1987). Long-term potentiation. Annual review of neuroscience, 10, 131–61.</ref> somewhere down the neural-networks, and will cause induction or LTP between the set of receptors or the set of sensory objects. In an optimal repetitions temporally sequence of similar inputs, the LTP will be strengthen.
 
See also [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_%28philosophy%29 the problem of identity]
====Simplicity and Induction====The relation between two similar phenomena might be very simpleopp. They may be linked directly. For instance, A sound of a broken glass may be directly connected to a braking glass. But it can be connected in more complex way, for instance there may be some computer that create a breaking sound, whenever I see a breaking glass. Or this connection may be correct until some time, ans it may be wrong in some future time<ref>[http://www.amazon.com/Fact-Fiction-Forecast-Fourth-Edition/dp/0674290712 Goodman, N., & Putnam, H. (1983). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Fourth Edition (p. 160). Harvard University Press.]</ref>. The reason to chose the most simple connection is because the number of available possible relations between a sound and a breaking glass are infinite. Therefore for reasons of effective storage, we will use the simplest solution available, which will be ''"All breaking glasses so far observed, has this specific sound"''.
Although this statement may be true it can not tell us nothing about the next occasion of breaking glass. If we will test it and we will find that next time we will hear a different sound, we might say that "All breaking glasses so far observed has this specific sound, while the last had another sound"''. By describing the relations between the phenomena in a descriptive mode, we may reach very fast to infinite numbers of description. So yet again for the sake of simplicity, we will try to describe the relations as inductions.