System 1
The automatic System (AS) also known as system 1. It excels in integrating information about single thing, but does not deal with several objects simultaneously. It uses broad relations like "all Xs are Y" or "X is higher then Y". It is good at habitual thinking and fast thinking[1]..
It is part of two systems of decision making, the first is the automatic-system(system 1) which decide fast by intuition and the second is the ECS which produce reasoning. The term system-1 and system 2 was given by Stanovich and West[2]
Rolls et al. describe the areas in which explicit (? system-2) and implicit (?system-1) decision making is done[3]. System-1 is handeld by the basal ganglia, and system-2 is handeld by the PFC[4][5][6].
Characteristics of System 1
From Kahnman, p. 106
- generates impressions, feelings, and inclinations; when endorsed by System 2 these become beliefs, attitudes, and intentions.
- operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort, and no sense of voluntary control
- can be programmed by System 2 to mobilize attention when a particular pattern is detected (search)
- executes skilled responses and generates skilled intuitions, after adequate training
- creates a coherent pattem of activated ideas in associative memory
- links a sense of cognitive ease to illusions of truth, pleasant feelings, and reduced vigilance
- distinguishes the surprising from the normal
- infers and invents causes and intentions
- neglects ambiguity and suppresses doubt
- is biased to believe and confirm
- exaggerates emotional consistency (halo effect)
- focuses on existing evidence and ignores absent evidence (WYSIATI)
- generates a limited set of basic assessments
- represents sets by norms and prototypes, does not integrate
- matches intensities across scales (e.g., size to loudness)
- computes more than intended (mental shotgun)
- sometimes substitutes an easier question for a difficult one (heuristics)
- is more sensitive to changes than to states (prospect theory)1
- overweights low probabilities
- shows diminishing sensitivity to quantity (psychophysics)1
- responds more strongly to losses than to gains (loss aversion)1
- frames decision problems narrowly, in isolation from one another.
References
- ↑ Khanman D., 2011, Thinking fast, Thinking slow p. 36
- ↑ Stanovich KE, West RF., Individual differences in reasoning: implications for the rationality debate? Behav Brain Sci. 2000 Oct;23(5):645-65; discussion 665-726.
- ↑ Value, pleasure and choice in the ventral prefrontal cortex. Fabian Grabenhorst, Edmund T Rolls (2011) Trends in cognitive sciences 15 (2) p. 56-67(summery)
- ↑ Rolls, E.T. and Grabenhorst, F. (2008) The orbitofrontal cortex and beyond: from affect to decision-making. Prog. Neurobiol. 86, 216–244
- ↑ Rolls, E.T. (2005) Emotion Explained, Oxford University Press
- ↑ Balleine, B.W. and O’Doherty, J.P. (2010) Human and rodent homologies in action control: corticostriatal determinants of goaldirected and habitual action. Neuropsychopharmacology 35, 48–69