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Conservatives and Liberals

Revision as of 13:34, 25 November 2012 by WinSysop (talk | contribs) (The causes in the light of brain research)
Overview of the theory of conservatives and liberals


Overview of the theory of conservatives and liberals


Conservatism and Liberalism in the context of deliberation is states of mind that create different reaction to deliberation. When people in the state of mind of conservatism they usually will be less suspitable to adopt new ideas, they will be more planed-action driven and sometimes more aggressive or fearful[1]. Conservatism is driving people to group more closely[2]. On a state of liberalism, people will be more ready to exam new ideas, be less action driven, and more friendly and cooperative toward strangers. In liberalism state, people tend to be more individualistic or to get along according to occasionally sharing of interests.

Contents

description of liberalism and conservatism

high levels proposed causes of liberalism and conservatism

Causes of conservatism

Jost et al, did a very large survey on research about conservatism. They have found two main causes for conservatism. One is a reaction to a state of fear, and the other is a reaction to a need to do work in limited time[3]. The idea that threat is causing people to bevcome more conservatives was further corroborated by an experiment that showed that under fear conditions, liberal students judge like conservative students[4].

The causes in the light of brain research

Chronic state of conservatism is chartrised by small anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and hyperactive amygdala[5]. The ACC is used to control efforts and also rostral ACC is active in learning intuitively social behaviors. if having small volume of the ACC, people will react more impulsively, and will have difficulty to understand social interactions. This will cause them to perceive unfamiliar people with less understanding and therefore with more mistrust.

See Amodio and Jost 2012


Causes of liberalism

To delveop...

(Fear and need for certainty, fits brain research.... and show how it fits)

Jost et al. hypothesis, fits well to the new understandings of how the brain works.

  1. Conservatives are more afraid[6].
  2. Conservatives have heightened sensitivity for detecting emotional faces and use emotion more effectively when campaigning. As the left face displays emotion more prominently[7]
  3. Liberals have higher ACC gray volume, where as conservatives have more amygdala volume[8]. ACC is connected to conflict resultion (rACC to social conflict and dACC to non-social conflict). Reward valence modulates conflict-driven attentional adaptation in the ACC[9]
  4. Mutation in dopamin receptor DRD4 and intra-subjective nurturing (measured by number of friendships in adolescence) promote liberalism, where as on non-mutated people the intra-subjective do not change the political attitude[10]

The story that can be told: Conservatives are more emotionaly responsive, and more afraid (More socially interacted?). liberals are more looking for conflict resultion under genetic DRD4 mutation, if they were nurtured in intra-subjective enviorment. They will be more active if they will be rewarded. Thus, Con will be more type II delibertives, where as Lib will be more type I deliberation. but without seeking for novelty gene, people will not move to become liberals? (Or tere may be other factors driving to liberality) The majorety of the poppulation will not look for Type I delibaration? maybe we have to recognise it, and adjust accordingly? specialty, knoweing to muve the massge of deliberation through type II society? reducing fear? need for leadership?Tal Yaron 11:33, 23 September 2012 (IST)


  1. Why fear inhibit learning?
  2. The mechanism - Its understanding is still lacking.
    1. High ACC activity as well as High ERN amplitude, create anxiety or depression, thus highly sensitive to punishment [11].
    2. Low ACC acitivity or Low ERN amplitude in punishment is correlated with low sociability. Normal socialty have same amplitude for punishment and reward[12].
  3. According to the mechanism
  4. Cases of Learning
    1. rACC
      1. rACC hyperactivity: rACC hyperactive will enhance the pain and effort feeling, thus inhibit action. actions will be made only if it is vary safe (in the OPC), or may have aesy and sure outcomes. This will lead to need for very safe root to advance. No new information will be gained (no AD -REP), thus lack of learning, or need to expreince new knowledge. To achieve activity, need for anger...
      2. rACC hypoactive thus create short term, premature activation, no calculative actions. There is lack of ability to learn in the social sphere, thus a need for simple theories in social experience. In this case a leader with firm and simple solutions, will be thought to direct the goals effectively. the Strength metaphor will prevail.
      3. Normal activity of the rACC: this situation will cause evaluation of the pain and effort according to rewards. and will anable social learning.
        1. Social negative criticism: When a child will be brought up by negative feedback, he will be prefer doing only socially excepted acts.
        2. Social appraisals: When kid will be brought up in these conditions, we will except that he will be more ready to look for social conformity, or search on his own.
        3. Safe and holding bringing:
    2. During long actions, as people get to acknowledge that long efforts are rewarding, there is no learning. If people will be stresses and will not let themselves a rest after each action, they will miss the learning phase. causing conservatism. It will happen to people that are stressed to work hard. Again, for work to be effective, the work should be done on safe and established grounds.
    3. Liberalism may be caused by dACC hypo-activity causing implosive actions on rational decisions. On the "rational" thinking there may be lack of learning, but the premature actions will cause novelty seeking on social interactions, and learning?
    4. Liberals, may have need for over estimation of their abilities, in order to make an effort.
  5. Meaning - balance between rewards and inhibition, and learning and Long-Term learning (DA).
    1. achieve this balance, to promote learning. RPE without stress will promote learning (Making an error, with appraisal, instead of negative feedback will encourage further learning. Yet, with pledge to achive goals, and not just "experience" thus promoting Decadence)



FFFF inhibits the ACC[13][14]. In fear the rostral ACC is responding to threat stimulis[15]. and it take resources frome the dorsal ACC, that is responible for cognitive conflict resulotion[16][17][18]. The threat do not influance much in non-clinicla groups[19]. but can be observed in clinical populations[20]. In anxiaty, the main mechanism, is of attention distraction[21].It is because of law rostral ACC acitivity (thus inability to concntrate) and reduced recurtment of laterl PFC (used for high control)[22]. It was found that in highy enxialty (in clinical population) the anxities showed less activation of the rosteral ACC, thus there are less able to disengage from the fear cause, and thus elevate fear levels.


When rostral ACC is not active, one can not learn.

Look also: PNAS lison survey (2012)

Suggested mechanism for conservatism

Basic Mechanism

explain mechanism:

  • FFFF -{ACCi -> mostly system1;(v)
    • FFFF-> seratonin->solidarity; (Paper 2010 and some others (v))
  • X(need to do work)-{ACCi -> mainly system1; (learn dorsal ACC (?))
  • ACCa -> search for novelity (some reward) (learn Dorsal ACC +gene for novility Dopamin2) (RPE), holy rod 2011

Fear or need for work -> system1

system2

Folllow by examples

Advance Mechanism

complex mechanism: areas of lib/con..... illiberals.....

Follow by examples

OK, we established theortical frame.

Discussion, or What can we do?

If FFFF and Certainty are the cause of con, then by changing them, we can start change the settings, so we can reduce ACC inhibition. When people get familier, they are less stressed--> reduction of fear....food, basic needs satisified...; certainty: I prime them by saing, we do not have to decide now, or it will not influance the future, or we do not have to solve anything.... or truth talk (avoid uncritical type II discusion), give yourself time....

Letriture review

Charectristics of Lib-Con

Liberalism and conservatism (LibCon) is a phrsae taken form the political scene, but it may apply to commerce, fashion and other social attitudes. In commerce, liberals, or early adopters, are people who tend to buy the newest products, while conservatives look for well tested products, who are old-fashioned [23]. Although the phenomena is well known, It's characteristics are buffleing. A well known attempt to understand the phenomena was don by Lakoffthe phenomena was done by Lakoff[24]. Lakoff put liberals on the carring and empathic moral and the conservatives on the strong moral, which divide the world in to good and evil.

The charectaristics of conservatives[25]

Causes of Lib-Con

Conservatives are more fearful, while liberals are more calm[26]. Conservatives percives thetening faces as more threatning[27].

There is a connection between liberalism and intelegence[28].

self motivation for conservatism

conservatism can be caused by:

  • FFFF
  • Important of actions and time presure, which sustaning information can be too costly[29][30][31][32][33][34]
    • Ambiant noise (White noise)[35]
    • Mental fatigue (Ego deplition)[36]
    • alcohol intoxication[37]
  • Low need for cognition
  • Personal need for structure[38])and there is a scale for cognitive closure NFCS[39]
    • Prefernce for order and sturcture.
    • Emotional discomfort associated with amvbigiuty (it can be domain specific and FFFF related. Tal Yaron)).
    • Impetiante and impolsivity with regard to decision making.
    • Desire for security and predictability.
    • Colsed-mindnessnes.

The Theory of RWA (Right-Wing Authoritarian): Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) is a personality and ideological variable studied in political, social, and personality psychology. Right-wing authoritarians are people who have a high degree of willingness to submit to authorities they perceive as established and legitimate, who adhere to societal conventions and norms, and who are hostile and punitive in their attitudes towards people who don't adhere to them. They value uniformity and are in favour of using group authority, including coercion, to achieve it. [40]. In it start the reserchers[41], proposed that harsh parenting styles brought on by economic hardship led entire generations to repress hostility toward authority figures and to replace it with an exaggerated deference and idealization of authority and tendencies to blame societal scapegoats and punish deviants.Altemeyer charcrized RWA as (p.148)[42]:

  • “a high degree of submission to the authorities who are perceived to be established and legitimate”;
  • “a general aggressiveness, directed against various persons, whichis perceived to be sanctioned by established authorities”; and
  • “a high degree of adherence to the social conventions which are perceived to be endorsed by society” .


Need for closure comply to regin idealogy[43][44]. But also when a need for closure is felt, also left-wing ideologies will become regid[45]. All in all, people with high need for closure will prefer rigid, construct and well defined theories[46].

Regulatory Focus Theory"(High demends, critisicem): When one has aspirations (ideals) and on the other hand responsibilites (oughts), and his parenting role models asked him to acomplish high goals, but was focused on saftey, avoding of negative outcomes combined with punishment, the child will grow up to be with strong need for closure, while holding, high ideas. This will be the base for some of the left-wing illiblerals ideologies[47][48].

Terror Management Theory[49]: fear of death may be a cause for political conservatism[50], and may motivate conservatism[51][52][53].Greenberg at al, suggested that TMT will no lead to conservatism, but just to strengthening of basic values[54].

Just world theory: The just-world hypothesis (or just-world fallacy) is the cognitive bias that all human actions eventually yield morally fair and fitting consequences, so that, ultimately: noble actions are duly rewarded and evil actions are duly punished. In other words, the just-world hypothesis is the tendency to attribute consequences to, or expect consequences as the result of, an unspecified power that restores moral balance; the fallacy is that this implies (often unintentionally) the existence of such a power in terms of some cosmic force of justice, desert, stability, or order in the universe.

The fallacy popularly appears in the English language in various figures of speech, which often imply a negative reprisal of justice, such as: "You got what was coming to you," "What goes around comes around," and "You reap what you sow." This phenomenon of this fallacy has been widely studied by social psychologists since Melvin J. Lerner conducted seminal work on the belief in a just world in the early 1960s[55]. Since that time, research has continued, examining the predictive capacity of the hypothesis in various situations and across cultures, and clarifying and expanding the theoretical understandings of just world beliefs[56].

Group motivation for conservatism

Social Dominance Theory (SDO): According to social dominance theory, human societies strive to minimize group conflict by developing ideological belief systems that justify the hegemony of some groups over others[57][58][59][60][61]. They achive it by legitmizing myths like (a) parental myth, in which the dominent group is the only one capable of mangment of the large group. (b)"reciprocal myth", in which every group should take it's place, and the dominante group shoul lead. (c) Sacred myth, which give dominence to one group over others by the authourity of God[62].

SDO and RWA compose of 50% of the statisitcal varience of prejudice and athnocentrism, which is large part of the affectors (Altemeyer 1998 p. 47). SDO is more dominante and RWA is more submissive[63]. as Jost et al put it "One can therefore infer that the most inexorable right-wingers are those who are motivated simultaneously by fear and aggression"[64].

Main Causes of Conservatism

The causes of conservatism according to Jost et al (2003)
The causes of conservatism according to Tal Yaron (2012)

"Theoretical and empirical considerations lead us to conclude that virtually all of the above motives originate in psychological attempts to manage uncertainty and fear[65]."These, in turn, are inherently related to the two core aspects of conservative thought mentioned earlier—resistance to change and the endorsement of inequality".Thus, epistemic needs affect the style and manner by which individuals seek to overcome uncertainty and the fear of the unknown[66][67][68][69]. Existential motives, too, involve a desire for certainty and security that is associated with resisting rather than fostering change, and is highly corolated for need for certenty[70][71].

Socio-Psycho Research

Evidence for and against the hypotheses that political conservatism is significantly associated with:

  • Cognitive needs
    • mental rigidity and closed-mindedness - The most contributng factor is mental rigidty[72][73][74][75]. Research on cognitive sophistication and integrative complexity provides the soundest basis for evaluating claims linking epistemic motivation to political ideology[76]. Recent work on personal need for structure[77] and the need for cognitive closure[78] helps to complete the picture.
    • increased dogmatism and intolerance of ambiguity - The right wingers are much more mentaly rigid (dogmatice) the left-wing extremists [79], according to the reserch in the field[80][81][82]. Right wingers, Modrate and extrem, are much more intolrate to ambiguty[83].
    • decreased cognitive complexity - Left-wingers have more cognitive complexity the right-wingers. Modrates in both wings, have more complexity then extrimists[84], but these results are not conclusive. Sidanius 1984/8 found that extremists from both sides are more engaged in political information search and conversation. but over-all conservatism is more related to lower cognitive complexity; r=-.2 p<0.0001
    • decreased openness to experience, in nonhuman experience. r=-.32 p<0.001 (Jost et al. 2003). Joe et al., found that cons. like to participate in decision making and humor experiments.
    • uncertainty avoidance: r=.34 p<0.0001 to conservatism (Jost et al. 2003). conservatives prefer simple and realistic paintings (Mathews 1973). Cons do not like to change work habits or use new technology (Fay and Frase 2000). r=-.27 p<0.001
    • personal needs for order and structure: cons like more tidy and representative clothing and are more tidy.(Altemyer 1998).
    • need for cognitive closure
  • Existential motives.
    • lowered self-esteem: lower self-esteem, produce impulsive closure. failure promotes cons behavior. r=-.09 p<0.001
    • fear, anger, and aggression: fear and threat correlate with con r=.18 p<.0001. neuroticism r=.3 p<.0001
    • pessimism, disgust, and contempt: more research is needed (Jost et al. 2003). not enough research was done on parental role and cons.
    • loss prevention: hard cons react better to loss prevention massages (Lavine et al 1999)
    • fear of death. very high correlation.
    • threat arising from social and economic deprivation - high rise of nazi after 1929 economic crises. but Jost fail to observe that there is rise of extremism on both sides. There seems that there was also rise in Communism.
    • threat to the stability ofthe social system: In time of crises there is growing need for strong leadership and conservatism.

Brain Research

Conservatives have lack of empathy.

People with more activation in the dorsal ACC, tend be more suspitable to PTSD[85]. (May be the more fearful need to use their dACC to calculate different options?). Where as people with ADD, which promote liberalism showed reduced activation of what seems to be the dACC[86].The dACC active in conflict monitoring[87], (and it may be that ADD will decide more impulsivly. But if they have stress, they (fear from failure) they will be unable to decide, as I have seen with my trainees Tal Yaron 08:31, 11 September 2012 (IDT)).

Liberals have more ACC volume whereas conservatives have more amygdala volume[88]


Sadness enhances the experience of pain via neural activation in the anterior cingulate cortex and amygdala[89].The Rostral Anterior Cingulate Cortex Modulates the Efficiency of Amygdala-Dependent Fear Learning[90].

Learning is induced because of surprise. The dACC is concerned more with attention and motor control processes involved in behavioral adjustment. The dopamine RPE system is the process from which a learning is happening[91].

Emotional processing in anterior cingulate and medial prefrontal cortex, 2011

Further readings

  • Jonathan Haidt: The moral roots of liberals and conservatives, on TED.
  • Jazvic said (look at Kahnman p. 67)that new experience is danger, and therefore, human an animals will avoid new exprience: mere-exprience effect. (especially if FFFF is working....)
  • Kahnman in thinking slow and fast p.76, said that in time of danger, it is to risky to relay on the mistakes of system 1, and therefore you will use System 2. I am not sure it is true, unless you have time and self control to activate system 2. maybe smart conservative will be more dependent on system 2.

References

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