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Conservatives and Liberals

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Overview of the theory of conservatives and liberals


Conservatism and Liberalism is a wide phenomena which presnt itslef in very divers areas of social life. It is well knowen that there are some who behave in a conservative way, and some in liberal way. Although it is well knowen phenomena, it was hard to charctrized precisly the properties of liberals and conservatives, and it is stil not very well established, what are the causes of liberalism and conservatism.

In this papae I will make an effort to give a coherent view of the cartrization of the lib-con phenomena, and will try to give also a coherent mechnism for the causes of lib-con, based on recent years research in psychology and neurocognitive.


Jazvic said (look at Kahnman p. 67)that new experience is danger, and therefore, human an animals will avoid new exprience: mere-exprience effect. (especially if FFFF is working....)

Contents

Paper

The question

Deliberate democracy aims at involving all the citizens in rational-communication which will help them make decisions according to reliable information which was produced in the intersubjective experience. While in the deliberation process we hope that people will change their minds according corroborated and reliable theories and evidences that stood the test of critical thinking, and chose together the most suitable solution. Yet we know that large proportion of the population is conservative, and according to research resists change in world view. This conflict between large scale participation and the resistance to change by substantial portion of the population is a challenge deliberative democracy developers need to address.

I suggest that if we will understand the mechanisms of resistance to change on the neurocognitive, psychological and social levels, we will be able to create better deliberation settings which will advance change of mind. In this paper I will focus on the neurocognitive mechanisms of rigidity of mind, and according to them I will suggest some basic deliberative settings which will promote more flexible thinking by participants of the deliberation process.

Conservatism is a social and psychological phenomena that is part of society. In every culture there are large proportion of people who resist changes in society. The proportion of conservatism in society may change according to many factors, and different societies in different times are tendencies into conservatism or liberalism. The level of openness to change or rejection of change may have different proportion and magnitude of inclination, in different cultures. Yet even in societies that are thought to be more liberal, conservatism, is strong and influential.

From the early 50s, the causes of conservatism was the scope of wide research. Jost et al[1] has done extensive literature review and summed the findings from 88 samples, involving a near of 23,000 participants from 12 countries. They have found that conservatism is correlated to several factors related to cognitive needs, and several factors related to existential motivation. They found that mental rigidity and closed-mindedness is the most contributng factor to conservatism[2][3][4][5]. Research on cognitive sophistication and integrative complexity provides the soundest basis for evaluating claims linking epistemic motivation to political ideology[6]. Recent work on personal need for structure[7] and the need for cognitive closure[8] helps to establish the link.

Letriture review

Charectristics of Lib-Con

Liberalism and conservatism (LibCon) is a phrsae taken form the political scene, but it may apply to commerce, fashion and other social attitudes. In commerce, liberals, or early adopters, are people who tend to buy the newst products, while conservatives look for well tested products, who are old-fashiond[9]. Although the phenomena is well knowen, It's cahrectarisitc are buffleing. A well knowen attempt to the phenomena was done by Lakoff[10]. Lakoff put liberals on the carring and empathic moral and the conservatives on the strong moral, which divide the world in to good and evil.

The charectaristics of conservatives[11]

Causes of Lib-Con

Conservatives are more fearful, while liberals are more calm[12]. Conservatives percives thetening faces as more threatning[13].

There is a connection between liberalism and intelegence[14].

self motivation for conservatism

conservatism can be caused by:

  • FFFF
  • Important of actions and time presure, which sustaning information can be too costly[15][16][17][18][19][20]
    • Ambiant noise (White noise)[21]
    • Mental fatigue (Ego deplition)[22]
    • alcohol intoxication[23]
  • Low need for cognition
  • Personal need for structure[24])and there is a scale for cognitive closure NFCS[25]
    • Prefernce for order and sturcture.
    • Emotional discomfort associated with amvbigiuty (it can be domain specific and FFFF related. Tal Yaron)).
    • Impetiante and impolsivity with regard to decision making.
    • Desire for security and predictability.
    • Colsed-mindnessnes.

The Theory of RWA (Right-Wing Authoritarian): Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) is a personality and ideological variable studied in political, social, and personality psychology. Right-wing authoritarians are people who have a high degree of willingness to submit to authorities they perceive as established and legitimate, who adhere to societal conventions and norms, and who are hostile and punitive in their attitudes towards people who don't adhere to them. They value uniformity and are in favour of using group authority, including coercion, to achieve it. [26]. In it start the reserchers[27], proposed that harsh parenting styles brought on by economic hardship led entire generations to repress hostility toward authority figures and to replace it with an exaggerated deference and idealization of authority and tendencies to blame societal scapegoats and punish deviants.Altemeyer charcrized RWA as (p.148)[28]:

  • “a high degree of submission to the authorities who are perceived to be established and legitimate”;
  • “a general aggressiveness, directed against various persons, whichis perceived to be sanctioned by established authorities”; and
  • “a high degree of adherence to the social conventions which are perceived to be endorsed by society” .


Need for closure comply to regin idealogy[29][30]. But also when a need for closure is felt, also left-wing ideologies will become regid[31]. All in all, people with high need for closure will prefer rigid, construct and well defined theories[32].

Regulatory Focus Theory"(High demends, critisicem): When one has aspirations (ideals) and on the other hand responsibilites (oughts), and his parenting role models asked him to acomplish high goals, but was focused on saftey, avoding of negative outcomes combined with punishment, the child will grow up to be with strong need for closure, while holding, high ideas. This will be the base for some of the left-wing illiblerals ideologies[33][34].

Terror Management Theory[35]: fear of death may be a cause for political conservatism[36], and may motivate conservatism[37][38][39].Greenberg at al, suggested that TMT will no lead to conservatism, but just to strengthening of basic values[40].

Just world theory: The just-world hypothesis (or just-world fallacy) is the cognitive bias that all human actions eventually yield morally fair and fitting consequences, so that, ultimately: noble actions are duly rewarded and evil actions are duly punished. In other words, the just-world hypothesis is the tendency to attribute consequences to, or expect consequences as the result of, an unspecified power that restores moral balance; the fallacy is that this implies (often unintentionally) the existence of such a power in terms of some cosmic force of justice, desert, stability, or order in the universe.

The fallacy popularly appears in the English language in various figures of speech, which often imply a negative reprisal of justice, such as: "You got what was coming to you," "What goes around comes around," and "You reap what you sow." This phenomenon of this fallacy has been widely studied by social psychologists since Melvin J. Lerner conducted seminal work on the belief in a just world in the early 1960s[41]. Since that time, research has continued, examining the predictive capacity of the hypothesis in various situations and across cultures, and clarifying and expanding the theoretical understandings of just world beliefs[42].

Group motivation for conservatism

Social Dominance Theory (SDO): According to social dominance theory, human societies strive to minimize group conflict by developing ideological belief systems that justify the hegemony of some groups over others[43][44][45][46][47]. They achive it by legitmizing myths like (a) parental myth, in which the dominent group is the only one capable of mangment of the large group. (b)"reciprocal myth", in which every group should take it's place, and the dominante group shoul lead. (c) Sacred myth, which give dominence to one group over others by the authourity of God[48].

SDO and RWA compose of 50% of the statisitcal varience of prejudice and athnocentrism, which is large part of the affectors (Altemeyer 1998 p. 47). SDO is more dominante and RWA is more submissive[49]. as Jost et al put it "One can therefore infer that the most inexorable right-wingers are those who are motivated simultaneously by fear and aggression"[50].

Main Causes of Conservatism

The causes of conservatism according to Jost et al (2003)
The causes of conservatism according to Tal Yaron (2012)

"Theoretical and empirical considerations lead us to conclude that virtually all of the above motives originate in psychological attempts to manage uncertainty and fear[51]."These, in turn, are inherently related to the two core aspects of conservative thought mentioned earlier—resistance to change and the endorsement of inequality".Thus, epistemic needs affect the style and manner by which individuals seek to overcome uncertainty and the fear of the unknown[52][53][54][55]. Existential motives, too, involve a desire for certainty and security that is associated with resisting rather than fostering change, and is highly corolated for need for certenty[56][57].

Research

Evidence for and against the hypotheses that political conservatism is significantly associated with:

  • Cognitive needs
    • mental rigidity and closed-mindedness - The most contributng factor is mental rigidty[58][59][60][61]. Research on cognitive sophistication and integrative complexity provides the soundest basis for evaluating claims linking epistemic motivation to political ideology[62]. Recent work on personal need for structure[63] and the need for cognitive closure[64] helps to complete the picture.
    • increased dogmatism and intolerance of ambiguity - The right wingers are much more mentaly rigid (dogmatice) the left-wing extremists [65], according to the reserch in the field[66][67][68]. Right wingers, Modrate and extrem, are much more intolrate to ambiguty[69].
    • decreased cognitive complexity - Left-wingers have more cognitive complexity the right-wingers. Modrates in both wings, have more complexity then extrimists[70], but these results are not conclusive. Sidanius 1984/8 found that extremists from both sides are more engaged in political information search and conversation. but over-all conservatism is more related to lower cognitive complexity; r=-.2 p<0.0001
    • decreased openness to experience, in nonhuman experience. r=-.32 p<0.001 (Jost et al. 2003). Joe et al., found that cons. like to participate in decision making and humor experiments.
    • uncertainty avoidance: r=.34 p<0.0001 to conservatism (Jost et al. 2003). conservatives prefer simple and realistic paintings (Mathews 1973). Cons do not like to change work habits or use new technology (Fay and Frase 2000). r=-.27 p<0.001
    • personal needs for order and structure: cons like more tidy and representative clothing and are more tidy.(Altemyer 1998).
    • need for cognitive closure
  • Existential motives.
    • lowered self-esteem: lower self-esteem, produce impulsive closure. failure promotes cons behavior. r=-.09 p<0.001
    • fear, anger, and aggression: fear and threat correlate with con r=.18 p<.0001. neuroticism r=.3 p<.0001
    • pessimism, disgust, and contempt: more research is needed (Jost et al. 2003). not enough research was done on parental role and cons.
    • loss prevention: hard cons react better to loss prevention massages (Lavine et al 1999)
    • fear of death. very high correlation.
    • threat arising from social and economic deprivation - high rise of nazi after 1929 economic crises. but Jost fail to observe that there is rise of extremism on both sides. There seems that there was also rise in Communism.
    • threat to the stability ofthe social system: In time of crises there is growing need for strong leadership and conservatism.

Further readings

References

  1. ↑ Jost et al. 2003...
  2. ↑ Adorno et al., 1950, in Jost 2003
  3. ↑ Rokeach, 1960 Jost 2003
  4. ↑ Wilson 1973c Jost 2003
  5. ↑ Christie 1954 Jost 2003
  6. ↑ (e.g., Gruenfeld, 1995; Sidanius, 1985, 1988; Tetlock, 1983, 1984) in Jost 2003
  7. ↑ Schaller et al., 1995, in Jost2003
  8. ↑ D. M. Webster & Kruglanski, 1994 in Jost2003
  9. ↑ Rogers Everett M., 1962,Diffusion of Innovations, Free Press of Glencoe, Macmillan Company
  10. ↑ Metaphor, Morality, and Politics, Or, Why Conservatives Have Left Liberals In the Dust ,George Lakoff, 1995
  11. ↑ Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition, Jost et al. Psychological Bulletin, 2003, Vol. 129, No. 3, 339–375
  12. ↑ Political Attitudes Vary with Physiological Traits, 2008, Hibbing et al. Science (Hebrew summery)
  13. ↑ JM. Vigil (2008) Facial Expression Processing Varies with Political Affiliation, Nature
  14. ↑ The Secret Lives of Liberals and Conservatives: Personality Profiles, Interaction Styles, and the Things They Leave Behind Dana R. Carney, John T. Jost, Samuel D. Gosling3, Jeff Potter4, Political Psychology, Volume 29, Issue 6, pages 807–840, December 2008
  15. ↑ A Dynamic and Stochastic Theory of Choice, Response Time, and Confidence (review in Hebrew)
  16. ↑ A paper about time and change of attitude for learning
  17. ↑ Author, 1990 , Time Pressure and Stress in Human Judgment and Decision Making
  18. ↑ *Jost, J. T., Kruglanski, A. W., & Simon, L. (1999). Effects of epistemic motivation on conservatism, intolerance, and other system justifying attitudes. In L. Thompson, D. M. Messick, & J. M. Levine (Eds.), Shared cognition in organizations: The management of knowledge (pp.91–116). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
  19. ↑ Kruglanski, A. W., & Freund, T. (1983). The freezing and unfreezing of lay inferences: Effects of impressional primacy, ethnic stereotyping, and numerical anchoring. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 19,448–468.
  20. ↑ Shah, J. Y., Kruglanski, A. W., & Thompson, E. P. (1998). Membership has its (epistemic) rewards: Need for closure effects on in-group bias. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 383–393.
  21. ↑ Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M. (1996). Motivated closing of the mind: “Seizing” and “freezing.” Psychological Review, 103, 263–283.
  22. ↑ Webster, D. M., Richter, L., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1996). On leaping to conclusions when feeling tired: Mental fatigue effects on impressional primacy. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 32, 181–195.
  23. ↑ Webster, D. M. (1994). Groups under the influence: Need for closure effects on the use of shared and unique information. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Maryland at College Park.
  24. ↑ Schaller, M., Boyd, C., Yohannes, J., & O’Brien, N. (1995). The prejudiced personality revisited: Personal need for structure and formation of erroneous group stereotypes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 544–555.
  25. ↑ Webster, D. M., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1994). Individual differences in need for cognitive closure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 1049–1062.
  26. ↑ Stenner, Karen (2009). "Three Kinds of “Conservatism". Psychological Inquiry: 142-159
  27. ↑ Adomo, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswilc, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). The authoritarian personality. New York: Harper.
  28. ↑ Altemeyer, R. A. (1981). Right-wing authoritarianism. Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada: University ofManitoba Press.
  29. ↑ Jost, J. T., Kruglanski, A. W., & Simon, L. (1999). Effects of epistemic motivation on conservatism, intolerance, and other system justifying attitudes. In L. Thompson, D. M. Messick, & J. M. Levine (Eds.),Shared cognition in organizations: The management of knowledge (pp. 91–116). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
  30. ↑ Golec, A. (2001, July). Need for cognitive closure and political conservatism: Studies on the nature of the relationship. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Cuernavaca, Mexico.
  31. ↑ *Rokeach, M. (1960). The open and closed mind. New York: Basic Books. Rorty, R. (1989). Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
  32. ↑ Kruglanski, A. W. (1989). Lay epistemics and human knowledge: Cognitive and motivational basis. New York: Plenum.
  33. ↑ Higgins, E. T. (1997). Beyond pleasure and pain. American Psychologist, 52, 1280–1300.
  34. ↑ Higgins, E. T. (1998). Promotion and prevention: Regulatory focus as amotivational principle. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 30, 1–45.
  35. ↑ Becker, E. (1973). The denial of death. New York: Free Press
  36. ↑ Wilson, 0. D. (l973). The temperamental basis of attitudes. In 0. D. Wilson (Ed.), The psychology of conservatism (pp. 187—196). London: Academic Press
  37. ↑ Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., & Solomon, 5. (1986). The causes and consequences of the need for self-esteem: A terror management theory.In R. F. Baumeister (Ed.), Public self and private self (pp. 189—207). New York: Springer-Verlag.
  38. ↑ Greenberg, 3., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Rosenblatt, A., Veeder, M., Kirkland, S., & Lyon, D. (1990). Evidence for terror management theory: II. The effects of mortality salience on reactions to those who threaten or bolster the cultural worldview. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 308—318.
  39. ↑ Rosenblatt, A., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., & Lyon,D.(1989). Evidence for terror management theory: I. The effects of mortality salience on reactions to those who violate or uphold cultural values. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 68 1—690.
  40. ↑ Greenberg, 3., Simon, L., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., & Chatel, D. (1992). Terror management and tolerance: Does mortality salience always intensify negative reactions to others who threaten one’s worldview? Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 63, 212—220.
  41. ↑ Lerner, M.J. & Montada, L. (1998). An Overview: Advances in Belief in a Just World Theory and Methods, in Leo Montada & M.J. Lerner (Eds.). Responses to Victimizations and Belief in a Just World (1–7). Plenum Press: New York
  42. ↑ Furnham, A. (2003). Belief in a just world: research progress over the past decade. Personality and Individual Differences; 34: 795–817.
  43. ↑ Pratto, F. (1999). The puzzle of continuing group inequality: Piecing together psychological, social, and cultural forces in social dominance theory. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 31, 191—263.
  44. ↑ Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 741-763.
  45. ↑ Sidanius, J. (1993). The psychology of group conflict and the dynamics of oppression: A social dominance perspective. In S. Iyengar & W. J.McGuire (lids.), Explorations in political psychology (pp. 183—219). Durham, NC: Duke University Press
  46. ↑ Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression. New York: Cambridge University Press
  47. ↑ Sidanius, J., Prattu, F., & Bobo, L. (1996). Racism, conservatism, affirmative action, and intellectual sophistication: A matter of principled conservatism or group dominance? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 476—490.
  48. ↑ Sidanius, J. (1993). The psychology of group conflict and the dynamics of oppression: A social dominance perspective. In S. Iyengar & W. J.McGuire (lids.), Explorations in political psychology (pp. 183—219)(look at pp. 207-209).Durham, NC: Duke University Press
  49. ↑ “Altemeyer, R. A. (1998). The other “authoritarian personality.” In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 30, pp. 47—91). New York: Academic Press. in p.75
  50. ↑ John T. Jost, Arie W. Kruglanski, Jack Glaser and Frank J. Sulloway, Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition, Psychological Bulletin 2003, Vol. 129, No. 3, 339—375 (p. 350. left col buttom)
  51. ↑ John T. Jost, Arie W. Kruglanski, Jack Glaser and Frank J. Sulloway, Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition, Psychological Bulletin 2003, Vol. 129, No. 3, 339—375 (p. 351. left col middle)
  52. ↑ Kruglanski, A. W. (1989). Lay episremics and human knowledge: Cognitive and motivational basis. New York: Plenum.
  53. ↑ Rokeach, M. (1960). The open and closed mind. New York: BasicBooks. Rorty, R. (1989). Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
  54. ↑ Sorrentino, R. M., & Runey, C. I. R. (2000). The uncertain mind: Individual differences in facing the unknown. Philadelphia: Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis
  55. ↑ Wilson, 0. D. (lid.). (l973). The psychology of conservatism. London: Academic Press
  56. ↑ Dechesne, M., Janssen, J., & van Knippenberg, A. (2000). Derogation and distancing as terror managementstrategies: The moderating role of need for closure and permeability of group boundaries. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 79, 923—932.
  57. ↑ McGregor, I., Zanna, M. P., Holmes, 1. 0., & Spencer, S. J. (2001). Compensatory conviction in the face of personal uncertainty: Going to extremes and being oneself. Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology, 80, 472—488.
  58. ↑ Adorno et al., 1950, in Jost 2003
  59. ↑ Rokeach, 1960 Jost 2003
  60. ↑ Wilson 1973c Jost 2003
  61. ↑ Christie 1954 Jost 2003
  62. ↑ (e.g., Gruenfeld, 1995; Sidanius, 1985, 1988; Tetlock, 1983, 1984) in Jost 2003
  63. ↑ Schaller et al., 1995, in Jost2003
  64. ↑ D. M. Webster & Kruglanski, 1994 in Jost2003
  65. ↑ Barker, E. N. (1963). Authoritarianism of the political right, center, and left. Journal of Social Issues, 19, 63—74.
  66. ↑ Altemeyer (1981, 1998) in Jost2003
  67. ↑ Billig (1984) in Jost 2003
  68. ↑ s (Barker, 1963; Christie, 1991; Elms, 1969; Pettigrew, 1958; Rokeach, 1960; Smithers & Lobley, 1978; Stacey & Green, 1971) in Jost 2003
  69. ↑ See Jost 2003, p. 353
  70. ↑ Jost 2003 p. 353
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