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Argument repertoire

Revision as of 00:46, 22 July 2014 by WinSysop (talk | contribs) (Measuring)

Argument repertoire is a method to measure quality of arguments in deliberation[1]. It is base on Deanna Kuhn work on arrguments[2]. For Kuhn, Those who can identify multiple explanations with genuine evidence for them, counterarguments to their own explanations, and a resolution in favor of their own explanation are at the highest levels of knowledge about the issue under discussion.

Measuring

For any given stated opinion on an issue, argument repertoire includes:

  1. The number of relevant reasons for the stated opinion.
  2. The number of relevant reasons for the opposite opinion.

The reasons provided must be relevant. By relevant, we mean reasons that are acknowledged in public discourse as plausible reasons. Irrelevant reasons could include a person’s statement that he or she liked Republicans or knew some Republicans.

Unlike Kuhn, Cappella et al., do not try to include genuine evidence in support of reasons as a part of the evaluation of argument repertoire, nor do they attempt to ascertain the coherence among multiple reasons (e.g., Tetlock, 1989[3]). Both dimensions are plausible components of argument repertoire. However, they want to employ measure in a survey context.

Genuine evidence is relatively infrequent, and Kuhn required a series of questions and probes in face-to-face interviews to elicit the little evidence that people offered.
Coherence (or integrative complexity) requires at least two arguments plus elaboration. In the current application, they have ignored integrative complexity.

References

  1. Cappella, J. N., Price, V., & Nir, L. (2002). Argument repertoire as a reliable and valid measure of opinion quality: Electronic dialogue during campaign 2000. Political Communication, 19(1), 73–93.
  2. Kuhn, D. (1991). The skills of argument. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  3. Tetlock, P. (1989). Structure and function in political belief systems. In A. Pratkanis, S. Breckler, & A. Greenwald (Eds.), Attitude structure and function. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.