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Regulatory Focus Theory

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Taken from Jost et all 2003. p.348-9

Higgins (1997, 1998) proposed a regulatory focus theory that is pertinent to the psychology of conservatism. This theory distinguishes between two categories of desired goals, namely those related to advancement, growth, and aspirations (ideals) and those related to safety, security, and responsibilities (oughts). Distinct regulatory systems are presumed to address these two classes of goals. The promotion system reflects individuals’ self-regulation in relation to their hopes and aspirations (ideals), and it gratifies nurturance needs. The goal of the promotion system is accomplishment. By contrast, the prevention system reflects self-regulation in relation to one’s duties and obligations (oughts), and the goal of this system is safety. According to this theory, a parenting history of protection focusing on the avoidance of negative outcomes combined with the exercise of punishment as a disciplinary tool produces a strong prevention focus as a stable individual orientation. A parenting style of encouraging accomplishments by focusing on achieving positive outcomes and withdrawing love as a form of discipline produces a strong promotion focus as a stable individual orientation.

It is also plausible that an emphasis on prevention (vs. promotion) induces a heightened need for cognitive closure as one consequence of the craving for a secure and comprehensible reality. Like the theory of lay epistemics, regulatory focus theory leaves open the possibility of anchoring disproportionately on left-wing ideas (to the extent that a leftist ideology constitutes the status quo), but at the same time, the theory suggests a general preference by prevention-oriented, versus promotion-oriented, individuals for conservative over liberal ideologies, all else being equal. Finally, like the theory of lay epistemics, regulatory focus theory allows for situational as well as personality factors to drive the inclination toward conservatism.

Regulatory focus, then, has fairly obvious implications for individuals’ attitudes toward stability and change, and perhaps even for left- versus right-wing preferences. Specifically, the promotion goals of accomplishment and advancement should naturally introduce a preference for change over stability, insofar as advancement requires change. The prevention goals of safety and security, on the other hand, should favor stability over change, to the extent that stability entails predictability and hence psychological security and control. In signal-detection terms, a promotion focus is concerned with obtaining hits and avoiding misses, whereas a prevention focus is concerned with obtaining correct rejections and avoiding false alarms. Any change has the potential benefit of providing an opportunity for advancement and accomplishment (a hit) but has the potential cost of introducing an error of commission. Because such an error is of relatively low concern to persons with a promotion focus, they should be relatively open to change. By contrast, stability has the potential benefit of safety and security (a correct rejection) but has the potential cost of introducing an error of omission, which is of lesser concern to individuals with a prevention focus who, therefore, should be resistant to change. To the extent that political conservatism is motivated, at least in part, by the desire for security and stability and the avoidance of threat and change, situations inducing a prevention-oriented regulatory focus might also induce a conservative shift in the general population.

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